Congressional Investigator Urges Security Hike at Nuclear Sites

WASHINGTON, DC, May 12, 2004 (ENS) - Actions taken by the Department of Energy (DOE) in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, while important, are not sufficient to ensure that all of DOE’s sites are adequately prepared to defend themselves against the higher terrorist threat present in the post September 11, 2001 world, Congressional representatives were warned on Tuesday.

Director of the Government Accounting Office's Natural Resources and Environment Robin Nazzaro testified before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, saying that the DOE still needs an effective safeguards and security program.

On behalf of the Congressional investigative arm, Nazarro told the subcommittee, "A successful terrorist attack on Department of Energy (DOE) sites containing nuclear weapons or the material used in nuclear weapons could have devastating consequences for the site and its surrounding communities."

His testimony comes five days after Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham announced comprehensive new measures to protect the nation's nuclear materials from terrorist attack that include a new elite force of guards, consolidation of nuclear materials, and safeguards against cyber attack.

In his evaluation of the Energy Department's response to the 9/11 attacks, Nazzaro said the new description of the potential dangers - known as the Design Basis Threat (DBT) - took too long to develop after 9/11.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, rendered the then current DBT obsolete, and the Energy Department issued a new version in May 2003.

The Energy Department took almost two years to develop a new DBT in part because of delays in developing an intelligence community assessment of the terrorist threat to nuclear weapons facilities - called the Postulated Threat, Nazzaro said.

DOE’s lengthy comment and review process for developing policy, and sharp debates within DOE and other government organizations over the size and capabilities of future terrorist threats and the availability of resources to meet these threats, were other factors in the two year delay, said Nazzaro.

Now that the new Design Basis Threat has been defined, the criteria that DOE has selected for determining when facilities may need to be protected against these forms of sabotage "may not be sufficient," Nazzaro warned.

"For example, for chemical sabotage, the 2003 DBT requires sites to protect to 'industry standards;' however, such standards currently do not exist.

In addition, the threat identified in the new DBT, in most cases, is less than the threat identified in the intelligence community’s Postulated Threat, on which the DBT has been traditionally based. The intelligence community's assessment is being downplayed by the Energy Department in framing its response.

Abraham and National Nuclear Security Administration head Linton Brooks have given Fiscal Year 2006 as the date when new security measures will be in place at DOE sites, but Nazarro told the subcommittee the Energy Department will have trouble meeting that deadline.

"DOE has been slow" to issue additional DBT implementation guidance, develop DBT implementation plans, and budgets to support these plans, Nazarro said, and that may affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat contained in the new DBT in a timely fashion.

"Consequently, DOE’s deadline to meet the requirements of the new DBT by the end of fiscal year 2006 is probably not realistic for some sites," he said.

In response to these concerns, Nazzaro said, the Energy Department has recently agreed to reexamine some of the key aspects and assumptions of the May 2003 DBT.