Elite Guard to Cover U.S. Nuclear Sites

WASHINGTON, DC, May 10, 2004 (ENS) - The federal government plans to upgrade security across the Energy Department’s network of laboratories and defense facilities, particularly those that contain weapons grade nuclear material. A new specialized security force will be put in place to guard the facilities that would have capabilities similar to the military’s elite Delta Force or Navy SEAL units, said Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham.

Abraham made the new initiative public Friday in a speech to top department security officers gathered at the Savannah River Nuclear weapons site, on the Georgia-South Carolina border.

The Energy Department, which develops and maintains the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, is responsible for protecting these materials. Abraham stressed that the fissile materials, which could be used to make a nuclear weapon, "must not be allowed to fall into the wrong hands.”

“Since the stakes are so high,” Abraham said, “everything is on the table,” including “a special elite federal force” to protect the most sensitive installations and the "federalizing" of some security units currently managed by contractors.

Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Photo courtesy Congressman Zach Wamp)

The consolidation effort would remove the most sensitive nuclear material from Los Alamos National Laboratory’s Technical Area 18 and the Sandia Pulse Reactor facility in New Mexico, and consolidate material stored at the Y-12 National Security Complex at Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

The new security measures are being established in response to repeated warnings from the intelligence community of terrorists' interest in acquiring U.S. nuclear materials. CIA Director George Tenet warned of al-Qaida’s interest in getting these materials as early as 1998, he told the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States on March 24.

"Al-Qaida’s interest in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons is strong," Tenet told the Commission. "Acquiring these is a religious obligation in [Osama] bin Ladin’s eyes. Al-Qaida and more than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursuing these materials," he said.

Compounding these threats, Abraham acknowledged recent reports of security lapses, such as lost keys, at some Department of Energy (DOE) sites, but he called the incidents "rare."

“But frankly, rare or not, they are unacceptable, and the failure of any and all levels of management to address instances such as these will not be tolerated,” Abraham said.

To improve the protection of sensitive information in case of an attack in cyberspace, Abraham announced a Cyber Security Enhancement Initiative to help “protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of all our information systems to assure that we can continue to perform our missions even while under cyber attack.”

The initiative, to be implemented within the next year, would deploy intrusion-detection systems to guard against potential cyber attacks, improve procedures to guard against internet threats and enhance the security of online information.

Citing past problems with computer disks and hard drives containing classified information, Abraham proposed “an initiative to move to diskless workstations for classified computing” to allow sensitive functions such as weapons design to be performed in a more secure diskless environment.

To eliminate issues of lost keys and key cards, Abraham said he intends to “do away with the use of mechanical keys as an important part of our protection system” and replace them with sophisticated new technologies that will allow “a keyless security environment, where access is not afforded by any physical item or object that can be lost or stolen.”

Abraham also called for regular reviews of DOE security standards and procedures to ensure “a modern efficient, effective guard force able to meet 21st century threats” and for new programs to train security officers and test their readiness to respond to attacks or attempts to infiltrate facilities.

The Administration Building, TA-3, Building SM-43 at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico (Photo courtesy LANL)

Abraham called for “a change in our management culture” to improve the way the department accepts, analyzes and responds to criticisms and concerns from outside the department as well as from employees, who Abraham said should be confident about raising questions or concerns without fear of retribution.

“If we are able to implement a system – a culture – where people can legitimately air concerns, then everyone will benefit. Our workforce will be more effective, the public’s confidence in this department will improve, and America’s security will be greatly enhanced,” he said.

Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Chairman Pete Domenici, a New Mexico Republican, expressed support for the new security measures, but also concern for the large expenditures that will be necessary to implement them. Domenici is also chairman of the Senate Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee that funds DOE and the national laboratories.

Calling security of nuclear material "a top priority," Domenici said he looks forward to working with the department "to implement the Secretary’s plan to deploy improved cyber security and other state-of-the-art technology to protect our sensitive material."

"But I continue to have concerns that security costs are outpacing any growth in the DOE budget," the senator said. "I will work with Secretary Abraham to consolidate special nuclear material where it makes financial sense and will not undermine the program.”

The reforms Abraham announced follow recommendations the nongovernmental organization Project on Government Oversight (POGO) has been urging since its 2001 report "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security at Risk," the Washington, DC based group said Friday.

Danielle Brian, executive director of POGO, lauded Abraham's announcement saying, "Today Secretary Abraham has articulated the most important priorities for addressing homeland security vulnerabilities posed by the nation's nuclear weapons complex. The agency and its contractors, however, have a long history of stonewalling security reforms. We look forward to ensuring the department implements Abraham's initiatives."

POGO has urged consolidation of plutonium and highly enriched uranium from Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia Pulse Reactor Facility in New Mexico, and the Y-12 site. In addition, the group has called for an improved definition of the threats facing nuclear facilities, improved training for guards, and a move to an information environment that is not dependent on media such as CDs that can be stolen.

Work is already underway on some of the measures Secretary Abraham announced on Friday.

Planning for nuclear shipments from Technical Area 18 at Los Alamos to the Nevada Test site, which is considered less vulnerable to terrorist attack, is well advanced. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Administrator Linton Brooks said in April that the shipments will start in September and are expected to take about 18 months.

NNSA and the U.S. Department of Energy decided in December 2002 to move the materials after an analysis of the technical site's old facilities and the high cost of security. The transfer was put on hold in the summer of 2003 after cost estimates tripled from the original estimate of $100 million.

Brooks says spending on security is top priority for his administration and for the energy secretary as well. Testifying April 27 before the Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Brooks said Secretary Abraham "has directed spending on security take priority over other program spending until we can guarantee that security."

Security guard at a Department of Energy site (Photo courtesy DOE Office of Security)

About half of this funding is spent on the protective forces that provide front-line security at NNSA facilities, said Brooks. The number of guards has increased from 2,100 to over 2,400 since 2001, and their capabilities to defend have been upgraded.

"Security positions are being hardened against blast and heavy weapons. To deny an adversary cover, lighting has been improved and fields of fire cleared around perimeters and critical facilities. Protective forces are being equipped with thermal imaging and night vision devices to further enhance their ability to detect and engage any adversary," Brooks said. "And, when and if they must engage, protective forces will be using upgraded weapons and munitions with increased range, accuracy, and lethality.

Overall security performance "as measured by independent reviews" is improving, Brooks told the subcommittee. "In the past year, no force-on-force performance testing by the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance has found security forces unable to protect the assigned assets on their site."

Brooks said many security upgrades are already in place. "Critical material has been consolidated and the frequency of patrols around retained materials and critical facilities has been increased," he said.

"Vehicle parking and movement has been controlled to increase the standoff distances around facilities for protection from vehicle bombs. Vehicle searches, including canine searches for bomb detection, have been stepped up. Temporary vehicle barrier systems have been put in place and construction of permanent barrier systems has begun."

"While I am pleased with the progress we have made, our long term security must be based on more than guns, gates, and guards," Brooks said. "In the 21st century, America’s technological prowess can provide invisible gates, omniscient over-watch, and lethal, accurate response capable of deterring or defeating any adversary."

National Nuclear Security Administration Administrator Linton Brooks addresses employees at Los Alamos National Lab, May 7, 2003. (Photo by Kevin Roark courtesy LANL)

In May 2003, the administration revised the definition of what is technically known as the Design Basis Threat - a profile of the type, composition, and capabilities of an adversary - to take into account the increased risk of terrorism.

Brooks told the subcommittee that "all NNSA sites have completed, and I have approved, plans to meet the Design Basis Threat by the end of Fiscal Year 2006."

Brooks said his administration is working closely with the rest of the DOE to meet that deadline and particularly with the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance on vulnerability analyses to validate planned security upgrades and detailed schedules for achieving implementation milestones.

More funding will be required to meet the new Design Basis Threat, said Brooks, because requirements to meet it were not fully evaluated before the FY 2004 budget request was made. He said $55.4 million will be squeezed out of the 2004 budget by "reprogramming" and another $89.9 million was added in the FY 2005 budget request.

The Nuclear Safeguards and Security Programs office is leading a team of security and budget specialists to each site to make sure their budgets cover all security requirements and ensure headquarters and sites are in agreement on priorities, Brooks said. A second team of experts has just completed visits to every site to review locks and keys procedures, collect best practices, and make recommendations for improvement.

Brooks said he wants to provide a “keyless” security environment within the next five to 10 years.

The Y-12 National Security Complex at Oak Ridge, Tennessee (Photo courtesy Federation of American Scientists)

The DOE explains that programs at Y-12 include manufacturing and reworking nuclear weapon components, dismantling nuclear weapon components returned from the national arsenal, serving as the nation's storehouse of special nuclear materials, and providing the U.S. Navy with nuclear propulsion systems.

In addition to the nuclear weapons work taking place at Y-12, the site stores 55,000 pounds of uranium hexafluoride, centrifuge equipment, and other materials removed from Libya in January.

Still, Brooks said he is "convinced" Y-12 will meet the deadline for implementation. Of the $89.9 million for Design Basis Threat requirements asked in the FY 2005 budget, about $25 million of that is earmarked for Y-12 in addition to nearly half the $55.4 million in the reprogramming request for a total of nealy $50 million.

Secretary Abraham is committed to a complete review of the entire weapons complex, Brooks said, including the suitability of Y-12 to continue as a federal nuclear site. But even before the review is complete, Brooks made his own conclusions clear.

"Moving Y-12 would be a lengthy, expensive endeavor that would impact the mission for at least a decade and would costs billions of dollars," he told the subcommittee. "During that time period, security at Y-12 would have to meet the same standard we are striving to achieve by the end of Fiscal Year 2006. For this reason, I do not believe moving Y-12 is a solution to our near term problems."

In June, Brooks will hold the first ever NNSA Safeguards and Security Summit, a gathering for top managers of federal nuclear sites, national laboratories, and nuclear power plants together with their senior security staffs.

“We are committed to making bold changes where necessary,” Abraham said Friday, adding that the new security initiatives “are designed to build and support the most robust and motivated protective force in the world.”