Questions About Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program Persist

VIENNA, Austria, June 15, 2004 (ENS) - Iran needs to be "proactive and fully transparent” in declaring the full extent of its nuclear activities, and should do so "within the next few months" if it wishes to build confidence in the international community, the head of the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency said Monday.

Speaking at the opening of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Board of Governors quarterly meeting in Vienna, Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said despite "steady progress" in cooperation with Iran, "a number of issues remain open regarding various aspects of Iran’s nuclear program," the central question being "whether Iran’s uranium enrichment activities have been fully declared."

ElBaradei said the agency still needs to clarify "the origin of the particles high-enriched and low-enriched uranium contamination" that IAEA inspectors have found at various locations "related to uranium enrichment in Iran."

The information provided by Iran in April 2004 - information requested since August 2003 - has not been sufficient to resolve this complex matter, he said. The IAEA is particularly concerned about the presence of a cluster of 36 percent uranium-235 particles at one location.

ElBaradei called on countries that may have supplied Iran with the uranium to come forward "to help us resolve these issues," but he made it clear that his mention of "supplier States" does not imply that the transactions "took place with the knowledge of the respective governments."

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei (right) meeting in Tehran with Dr. Hassan Rohani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security. October 16, 2003. (Photo by Melissa Fleming courtesy IAEA)

In its October 2003 communication with the IAEA, Iran did not mention the centrifuges, which are used in the enrichment of uranium. Because of the characteristics of these P-2 gas centrifuges, the Iranian facility could be used for the production of low enriched uranium for civil purposes or highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

"Then, in January 2004, Iran acknowledged that it had received P-2 drawings from a foreign intermediary," ElBaradei said. "At that time, Iranian authorities stated that Iran had not obtained any P-2 centrifuges, or components thereof, from abroad, and also stated that the P-2 program had been only for small scale R&D."

Then in April 2004, "Iran informed the agency that it had, in fact, imported some components relevant to its P-2 enrichment activities - and in late May acknowledged specifically that these components were magnets relevant to P-2 centrifuges, and that, in 2002, it had attempted to obtain thousands of these magnets," ElBaradei said.

Currently, the agency has gathered more information about the centrifuge program, which is now being assessed. "We have also taken environmental samples relevant to this issue, which are currently undergoing analysis," said the director general.

The gas centrifuge enrichment plant at Natanz, Iran. February 7, 2003. The two white arrows from the top indicate buildings under construction that were intended to house centrifuges. The arrow from the bottom indicates a building housing a centrifuge pilot plant with 200 machines. (Drawing from commercial satellite images courtesy David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, ISIS)

Reporting on the status of nuclear inspections in other countries, ElBaradei told the Board that since Libya announced its decision last December to eliminate all nuclear weapons materials, equipment and programs, Tripoli has "proactively cooperated" with the IAEA inspectors "by providing information and prompt access to all locations requested."

Good progress has been made in Libya but some issues have yet to be resolved, said the director general. "Examples of these issues include: confirmation of the origin of the uranium hexafluoride (UF6) Libya received in 2000 and 2001; verification of Libya’s planned capabilities for UF6 production; and understanding the source of high enriched and low enriched uranium contamination on gas centrifuge equipment in Libya."

With regard to Iraq, ElBaradei pointed out that the recent UN Security Council resolution 1546 reaffirmed the intention of the Council to revisit the mandate of the IAEA in Iraq.

It has now been more than a year since IAEA inspectors were in Iraq. "Given the current level of instability in the country, and Iraq’s past nuclear weapons related activities and capabilities, it is important and urgent that a credible verification and monitoring system be reinstalled," the director general said.

IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei at the press conference on talks between the IAEA, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, and Iraq. October 1, 2002. (Photo by Dean Calma courtesy IAEA)

On improving the safety of nuclear power reactors, a number of issues continue to be of concern, said ElBaradei, although "substantial progress has been made."

As nuclear power technology spreads and more countries develop their own plant designs, it is more important than ever to ensure quality; manage and share knowledge; and utilize common, internationally accepted safety standards, said the director general.

In addition, he said, "events continue to be reported with root causes that call into question the effectiveness of safety at nuclear facilities."

Questionable decisions and aging equipment show the need for improvements within "both the regulatory authorities and the operating organizations," ElBaradei said.

The agency is working to develop an international consensus on sound approaches for dealing with these issues, and will hold a major conference in October in Beijing, with the theme "Continuous Improvement of Nuclear Safety in a Changing World."