GAO: First Responders' Detection of Hazardous Releases Inadequate

While the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, and other agencies have undertaken initiatives to improve first responders' tools, these tools have many limitations for identifying chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials released in urban environments, either accidentally or by terrorists, the extent of their dispersion, and their effect on urban populations, the report warns.

The investigation was conducted at the request of a bi-partisan group of U.S. senators and members of Congress.

On the Senate side, they are Robert Byrd, a West Virginia Democrat who chairs the Senate Appropriations Commitee; Joseph Lieberman, a Connecticut Independent who chairs the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; and Susan Collins, a Maine Republican who is the ranking member of that committee.

On the House side, requesters are John Dingell, Michigan Democrat who chairs the Committee on Energy and Commerce; David Price, a North Carolina Democrat who chairs the House Subcommittee on Homeland Security; Bart Stupak, a Michigan Democrat who chairs the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations; and Christopher Shays, the ranking member of the House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs.

The two primary tools for identifying chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents and their dispersion and effect are equipment to detect and identify the agents and plume models to track the dispersion of airborne releases of these agents.

To assess the detection equipment and urban plume modeling for first responders' use, GAO personnel conducted the review from July 2004 to January 2008. They met with and obtained data from agency officials and first responders in three states - Connecticut, New Jersey, and Washington.

They found that no agency has the mission to develop, certify, and test equipment that first responders can use for detecting radiological materials in the atmosphere.

Department of Homeland Security officials told the investigators that chemical detectors are "marginally able" to detect an immediately dangerous concentration of chemical warfare agents.

But handheld detection devices for biological agents are not reliable or effective, they said.

The Department of Homeland Security's BioWatch program monitors air samples for biothreat agents in selected U.S. cities but does not provide first responders with real-time detection capability.

Under the BioWatch system, a threat agent is identified within several hours to more than one day after it is released, and how much material is released cannot be determined.

The GAO found that the Department of Homeland Security has adopted few standards for chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear detection equipment and has no independent testing program to validate whether it can detect these agents at the specific sensitivities manufacturers claim.

DHS has a mission to develop, test, and certify first responders' chemical and biological detection equipment, but testing and certification cover only equipment the department develops, not what first responders buy.

As of October 30, 2007, DHS had adopted 39 total standards for chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear equipment but had adopted only four standards for radiation detection instruments targeted at the interdiction and prevention of smuggling radioactive material and none for chemical and biological detection equipment.

The remaining standards address personal protective equipment such as respirators and protective clothing.

Interagency studies show that federal agencies' models to track the atmospheric release of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials have major limitations in urban areas.

A robot is used in a TOPOFF exercise. (Photo courtesy U.S. State Dept.)

DHS's national Top Officials, or TOPOFF, exercises conducted to strengthen the nation's capacity to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from large-scale terrorist attacks, have demonstrated "first responders' confusion over competing plume models' contradictory results," the GAO reports.

The first TOPOFF was held in May 2000 in Denver, Colorado, and in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Denver participants faced a simulated chemical attack, while New Hampshire participants were confronted with a biological attack.

TOPOFF 2, conducted in May 2003 to simulate a radioactive release as well as biological and chemical releases, included over 8,000 participants in Seattle, Washington and Chicago, Illinois and involved participation by the Canadian government.

TOPOFF 3, held April 4-8, 2005 and sponsored by DHS's Directorate for Preparedness, was the most comprehensive terrorism response exercise ever conducted in the United States, simulating biological attacks in New Jersey and chemical attacks in Connecticut. It involved over 20,000 participants representing more than 250 federal, state, and local agencies; private businesses; volunteer groups; and international organizations.

The GAO report found that confusion arose among first responders during these exercises when plume models developed for urban areas showed variable predictions.

The GAO reports that these models are limited in obtaining accurate data on the characteristics and rate of hazardous materials released.

In addition, the agency created to coordinate modeling predictions, the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center, lacks procedures to resolve contradictory predictions, the GAO found.

Data on population density, land use, and complex terrain are critical to first responders, but data on the effects of exposure to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials on urban populations "have significant gaps," the report warns.

The GAO reports that scientific research is lacking on how low-level exposure to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material affects civilian populations, especially elderly persons, children, and people whose immune systems are compromised.

The GAO report contains four main recommendations for the Secretary of Homeland Security.

First, the secretary should reach agreement with agencies on who will have the mission and responsibility to develop, certify, and independently test first responders' equipment for detecting hazardous material releases;

Then the secretary should ensure testing and validation of manufacturers' claims about the detection equipment's sensitivity and specificity;

In addition, the secretary should refine the procedures used by the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center, IMAAC, for addressing contradictory modeling predictions in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear events.

Finally, with IMAAC, the secretary should work with the federal plume modeling community to accelerate research and development on model deficiencies in urban areas and improve federal modeling and assessment capabilities, a process that could take several years. This recommendation was contributed by the Department of Commerce after a review of the GAO's draft report.

After reading the draft GAO report officials at the Department of Homeland Security "concurred with our recommendations," the GAO said, but advised considering alternative scenarios.

Penelope McCormack, acting director of the DHS-GAO Liaison Office stated in a letter of comment that in one alternative scenario, in the event of a terrorist attack first responders will use a variety of prescreening tools, and they will be assisted immediately by state and federal agencies that will bring the best available state-of-the-art detection equipment.

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